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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to examine whether foreign direct investments (FDI) in 
extractive sector enhances growth, using data from seven MENA oil producing countries; 
namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Iran over 
the period 1980 to 2004. We employ fixed effects estimation technique to estimate the 
coefficients of our models. The main findings are: First, the effect of FDI is very small, 
and it can have positive spillovers in the host countries if there are adequate absorptive 
capacities – well developed financial markets and human capital. Second, the financial 
markets are inadequate to spur growth and enhance the role of FDI in the growth process 
in MENA oil producing countries. The paper opines that policy focus should be towards 
improving the absorptive capacities, as growth should evolve internally, not externally.  
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1  Introduction 
The growth performance of the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region over the 
past decades has been mixed and characterized by a higher degree of volatility despite 
abundant natural resources and the inflows of foreign direct investment to the region. This 
growth pattern in the region is linked to several characteristics which include amongst 
others, the over dependence on oil, weak economic base, high population growth and 
unemployment rates, low rates of returns on investment in physical and human capital 
(Makdis et al., 2000) and underdeveloped financial market institutions, and on wider front 
by fluctuations in the world oil market. Therefore changes in the world oil market will 
mean changes in   economic growth. That is a decline in the prices of oil and gases will 
lead to decline in the growth of MENA oil producing countries and consequently to low 
savings and domestic investments. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has come to be regarded as a means to achieve economic 
development in its own right, with expected positive spillovers over and above those 
associated with domestically financed investments. The pace of economic development in 
South East Asia in recent decades has for example often been attributed – at least in part – 
to openness to and inflows of foreign direct investment. On this background, it is 
important to ask whether or not MENA countries might be missing out, and should 
include financial incentives to attract FDI as part of a development strategy. 
Implementing costly financial incentives obviously only makes sense if the expected 
positive externalities associated with the particular type of FDI that the financial incentive 
is aimed at outweigh the cost of the incentive. However, while it is possible to make a 
relatively good estimate of the cost of a financial incentive, assessing and quantifying 
potential positive externalities of FDI is problematic, at best, in oil producing countries. 
The findings of the empirical literature aiming at identifying the impact of FDI on growth 
mainly show that there is no universal answer to the question of how FDI impacts growth 
in its host country. In a recent study Akinlo (2004) finds that FDI in extractive sector in 
Nigeria does not support growth. This, he attributes to heavy capital outlay, a little 
employment and repatriation of profits leading to low capital accumulation. The impact of 
FDI depends on a multitude of factors, such as the level of technology used in domestic 
production in the host country, the level of education of the host country workforce, the 
level of financial sector and institutional development, etc. All these factors and more 
contribute to whether the host country in question can “absorb” and hence benefit from 
FDI. And this multitude of factors is impossible to capture in a single economic model or 
regression analysis. The empirical debate on this topic is, moreover, in its infancy, and is 
thus fragmented and thin.  It has nevertheless led to some tentative conclusions which can 
provide an overall framework for thinking about the benefits of FDI as a means to 
development; this may provide useful information for the formulation of a general 
strategy with respect to foreign direct investment in MENA countries and  in particular oil 
producing countries. 
Against this background, we formulated the following questions to investigate the role of 
FDI in extractive sector in the growth process of the MENA oil producing countries. 1) 
Do foreign direct investments in extractive sector enhance growth or not? In other words 
does FDI in extractive sector have greater knowledge spillover? The country’s capacity to 
take advantage of these externalities might be limited by lack of well-developed local 
financial markets and human capital. This leads to the second question. 2) What are the 
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growth effects of different forms of financial systems? 3) Is financial market necessary for 
FDI in extractive sector to be beneficial to growth? 
These are the focal objectives of this study and analyzing them is a first step toward 
identifying what needs to be done to make growth more sustainable in MENA oil 
producing countries. Literature on the impact of mineral based FDI on growth is scanty. 
The only studies that attempt to address this issue are that of Akinlo (2004), and Onwuka 
and Baharumshah (2005) who show that FDI in extractive sector is not growth enhancing 
as much as manufacturing FDI. In the manufacturing sector, there is a multitude of studies 
but however there is no conclusive statement on the role of FDI in enhancing growth. The 
contribution of this paper to empirical literature is of twofold. Firstly it sheds some light 
on the ongoing debate whether FDI in extractive sector enhances growth. It has been a 
subject of debate that economies with mineral deposits perform poorly in growth process. 
Studying MENA oil producing countries will provide more useful information on the link 
between FDI in extractive sector and growth.  Secondly on the policy front, it gives an 
insight to policymakers of what is wrong and the likely direction to follow and where 
emphasis should be laid.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section gives an overview of MENA oil 
producing economies. Section three discusses the theoretical and empirical evidence of 
the effect of FDI on growth as well channels through which FDI can influence growth. 
Section four gives the model used to investigate hypothesis that FDI in extractive sector 
enhances growth. Section five discusses the empirical results, while section six gives the 
policy implications of the empirical findings. Seventh section gives the concluding 
remark. 
 
 
2  An Overview of Selected MENA Economies  
Most of the selected MENA countries for analysis are characterized by dependency on 
one commodity exports – crude oil, for revenue accumulation. Manufacturing and other 
activities are of small scale (see Table 1). The oil and gas contribution to GDP is well 
above 40%; only Saudi Arabia is below this figure in 2004, suggesting that it is 
diversifying its economy. The growth in the region is highly volatile and also varies 
among the countries.  The average growth rate ranges from (-6.7%) in Qatar between the 
period of 1980 and 1989, to maximum of 9.89% for Bahrain between the period 2000 and 
2004. Real per capita GDP is very high. The low income country among the group is Iran, 
with the average per capita GDP of $2355.51 in 2000 - 2004 and the high income country 
is Qatar with real average per capita income of $30,868 in the same period.  
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Table 1:  Some Economic Indicators of Selected MENA Oil Producing Countries 
 
 
GDP Growth rate 
(%)  Inflation (%)  
GDP per capita 
(US$)  
Current  Account (% 
GDP  
             
Countr
ies 
1980 - 
1989 
1990 - 
1999 
2000 - 
2004 
1980 -
1989 
1990 - 
999 
2000 - 
2004 
1980 - 
1989 
1990 - 
1999 
2000 - 
2004 
1980 - 
1989 
1990 - 
1999 
2000 - 
2004 
Bahrai
n  1.42 4.61 9.89 2.3 0.79 0.82 8612 9462 13364 25.51 -45.2 37.71 
Kuwait -2.6 1.7 6.44 3.6 3.1 1.414 13381.7 13838.8 17067.4 32.01 -10.7 26.55 
Oman 8 4.7 4.64 -5.5 1.1 -0.44 6147.9 7571 8781 4.42 -4.39 3.78 
Qatar -6.7 7.2 5.92 3.8 3.1 2.52 20838.9 19422.1 30868    
S. 
Arabia -6.6 2.7 9.00 0.07 1.3 -0.18 11156.3 9018.2 9607 -3.42 -7.02 3.21 
UAE  5.78 7.06   2.96 32298.5 23504.6 21365.4    
Iran -3.2 2.8 4.13 3.7 36.6 141.6 3176.3 3918.87 2355.51 -0.737 1.68 12.51 
             
 GFCF (%GDP)  Crude petroleum and Gas (%of GDP      
 
1980 - 
1989 
1990 - 
1999 
2000 - 
2004 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004     
Bahrai
n  27.8 15.58 26.32 27.9 24.5 24.4 24.7 23.3     
Kuwait 18.02 17.91 9.68 49 43.9 38.1 42.1 47.6     
Oman 24.13 16.22 14.28 48.7 42.6 41.9 41.2 42.3     
Qatar  30.03  60.4 57 56.8 60.4 62.2     
S. 
Arabia 20.53 19.5 17.94 36.8 33.2 33.1 36.2 41.9     
UAE 50.02 50.07 60.78 33.6 29.5 26.6 28.6 32.5     
Iran 17.35 22.18 28.2          
Source: World Development Indicator, Gulf Investment Corporation 
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The inflation rate is generally low except in Iran, where it reaches 141.1 % on average 
between 2000 – 2004 periods. Iran's economy is marked by a bloated, inefficient state 
sector, over reliance on oil, and state policies that create major distortions throughout. 
Most economic activity is controlled by the state. Private sector activity is typically small-
scale - workshops, farming, and services leading to high inflation and unemployment rate. 
Current account positions vary. While Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman recorded current 
account surplus in 1980s, Saudi Arabia and Iran had current account deficit. In 1990s 
most of the economies recorded current account deficit, except Iran. As these countries 
depend on oil export for greater part their revenue generation, the deficit resulted from 
low oil price in later part of 1990s. However there is a great improvement in current 
account positions of the most economies in 2000s. Relatively high oil prices in recent 
years have enabled these countries to improve the current account positions.  
 
Table 2: Distribution of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows, 1990 - 2004 
 
1990 - 
95 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  
Panel A Regional FDI inflows, 1990 - 2003, billions of US Dollars 
World  225.32 386.14 478.08 690.9 1,086.75 1,387.95 817.57 678.75 559.58  
Africa 4.32 5.84 10.74 9.11 11.59 8.73 19.62 11.78 15.03  
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 22.26 52.86 74.3 82.49 107.41 97.54 88.14 51.36 49.72  
Asia 47.32 93.33 105.83 102.2 112.59 146.07 111.85 94.38 10.12  
South, East, and South 
east Asia 44.56 87.84 96.34 92.14 109.12 142.68 102.23 86.33 96.92  
Central and Eastern 
Europe 6.01 13.55 19.11 24.31 26.52 27.51 26.37 31.23 20.97  
Arab Countries 2.8 3.6 7.37 9.67 3.28 4.33 10.76 5.87 8.33  
Developing Countries 74.29 152.69 191.02 194.1 231.88 252.46 219.72 157.61 172.03  
Developing Countries / 
World (%) 32.97 39.54 39.96 28.09 21.34 18.19 26.87 23.22 30.74  
Arab Countries/ 
World (%) 1.24 0.93 1.54 1.4 0.3 0.31 1.32 0.86 1.49  
Arab/ 
Developing countries (%) 3.77 2.36 3.86 4.98 1.41 1.71 4.9 3.72 4.84  
Panel B: Selected MENA Countries millions of US Dollars, 1990 - 2004 
Bahrain 278.15 2048.20 329.26 179.52 453.72 363.56 80.40 217.02 516.70 865.30 
Kuwait -17.39 26.00 53.00 24.00 35.00 39.00 61.00 548.00 482.00 500.00 
Oman 10.34 347.00 20.00 59.00 72.27 16.30 -147.00 7.00 -67.11 -20.00 
Qatar 96.20 59.82 65.03 101.44 39.01 83.20 390.10 26.00 528.00 -18.20 
Saudi Arabia 64.08 338.87 418.33 347.30 113.25 251.60 295.52 623.92 624.92 679.00 
UAE 362.50 64.00 57.00 94.00 123.00 183.00 504.00 453.00 778.46 1867.50 
Iran 150.58 300.52 232.43 257.66 -984.94 -514.56 1184.32 1306.69 29.88 840.00 
Sources: World Development Indicators Database 
 
Since the early 1980s world FDI flows have grown rapidly. During 1990 – 1999, global 
FDI increased at an average rate of 15.7% a year, while in the period 2000 – 2003 it 
decreased by 5.17%.  In quantitative terms, the average value of global FDI between 1990 
and 1995 is $225.32 billions and it increased to $1,387.95 billions in 2000 and decreased 
to $559.58 billions in 2003 (see Table 2). As FDI flows have grown in volume they have 
also become more widely dispersed among the host countries. The share of developing 
countries in the global FDI varies over time. It is 32.97% in during the period 1990 – 
1995, 18.19% in 2000 and 30.74% in 2003. 
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Among the developing countries the distribution of FDI is uneven. The share of Arab 
countries in World FDI inflows is very small. Between 1990 and 1995 it had 1.24% of the 
World FDI inflows. It fell to 0.31% in 2000 and rose slightly to 1.49% in 2003. Although 
generally the FDI inflows to developing countries is low, compared to World FDI 
inflows. It is not surprising then that FDI did not make an impact on economic growth of 
the developing countries. The panel B takes a look at the FDI inflows in the countries 
under investigation. The FDI inflows are moreover small. The percentage of FDI in gross 
fixed capital formation is less than 0.05%. The greater proportion of gross fixed capital 
formation is domestically financed.  
While FDI represents investment in production facilities, its significance for developing 
countries is much greater. Not only can FDI add to investible resources and capital 
formation but perhaps more importantly it is also a means of transferring production 
technology, skills, innovative capacity, organisational and managerial practices between 
locations, as well as accessing international marketing network. These benefits can be 
harvested if the environment is conducive and there is enough absorptive capacity with a 
link between foreign affiliates and domestic firms. It suffices to say that FDI in extractive 
sector may not have much of these benefits as domestic firms may not have any link with 
the foreign affiliates; knowledge acquired will not be utilized elsewhere and oil drilling 
involves a huge capital outlay which locals would not be able to provide.  Hence lack of 
spillovers often found in most recent empirical research seems to be valid, considering the 
relative proportion of FDI in gross fixed capital formation  
 
 
3  Literature Review 
3.1 Theory of FDI and Growth 
Foreign direct investment can affect growth and development directly by contributing to 
gross fixed capital formation, and through several indirect channels which constitute the 
externalities associated with FDI. Krogstrup and Matar (2005) numerate the channels 
through which FDI affect growth. These channels can be grouped into two – direct and 
indirect channels. The direct channel does not favor FDI over other types of investment 
and would not in and of itself justify costly incentives for attracting FDI without 
providing the same incentives to domestic direct and foreign portfolio  investment. 
Through the indirect channels, however, FDI is often argued to additionally affect various 
parts of the host economy, and in turn spur growth. This indirect channel is categorized 
into three – crowding channel, the linkage channel, and human capital channel. 
In the crowding channel, FDI by a multinational corporation may trigger an additional 
need for financing which could be sought in domestic capital markets in order to 
complement the initial foreign direct investment. The potential additional domestic 
portfolio financing can be a positive externality leading to crowding in but may also have 
negative financial crowding out effects on domestic investments when the supply of 
domestic financial resources are scarce. Along the same lines, when FDI brings in a 
product already produced in the local market, the foreign affiliate enters into a 
competitive position with domestic industry and may crowd out some of the demand for 
local investment. Notwithstanding issues of efficiency and competition, this will in 
isolation have a negative impact on domestic gross fixed capital formation. The reverse 
case of crowding in can also be true in case the FDI introduces a new product into the 
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host economy and creates a demand for locally produced intermediate goods which did 
not exist before. Finally, in the case of scarcity of skilled labor in the host country, FDI 
may also draw skilled labor away from domestic industries, which will then lead to a 
negative impact on domestically owned economic activities, in turn inducing additional 
negative crowding-out effects on local investment. Whether the crowding channel leads to 
a positive or a negative spillover cannot be determined a priori; empirical investigation is 
essential.   
However, in the linkages channel FDI may play an important role in transferring new 
technology to the host economy, which in turn may lead to higher productivity and 
growth. This positive spillover in principle comes about through outsourcing and or 
through interaction of the multinational corporation with local suppliers, costumers and 
by imitation of technological know-how by local competing producers. Since a 
multinational will be interested in protecting its competitive edge among firms in the 
same industry, but has an interest in improving the efficiency and product quality of 
upstream suppliers, the linkages channel should be expected to work through backward 
linkages in particular, rather than through horizontal technology transfers or even forward 
linkages (see Javorcik, 2004).  
In the case of human capital channel FDI can have a positive impact on human capital 
development through the training and transfer of skills, managerial know-how and 
expertise to local employees and staff of upstream suppliers. A potential fourth channel 
often discussed is the market opening channel. Multinational corporations may give host 
economies access to new markets through its established trade relations. Increased 
exposure to global markets may, in the best of cases, give incentives to increase efficiency 
and competitiveness in host-economy exporting industries. 
The overall impact of FDI on the host economy depends on the relative quantitative 
importance of these potential spillovers. For the unambiguously positive linkages and 
human capital channels to work, a certain level of “absorptive capacity” of the host 
country in terms of level of technology of the host economy, educational level of the work 
force, level of infrastructure, financial and institutional development, etc., is now 
generally considered necessary. For example, a lack of financial development will prevent 
domestic and foreign firms from gaining financial resources for the desired technological 
upgrading which may be triggered by the linkages channel (see Sadik and Bolbol, 2003). 
Well functioning financial markets on the other hand will allow an efficient allocation of 
technology enhancing investments, lowers transaction cost, ensures that capital is 
allocated to the projects with highest returns, allows firms to achieve economies of scale 
and captures the spillover effects. Lack of financial markets can constrain potential 
entrepreneurs and the potential of FDI spillover to create backward linkages (Alfaro et al. 
(2004). Strong and sustainable economic base can only be assured if the nationals 
participate in the downstream industries of extractive sector. Moreover, lack of sufficient 
schooling of the domestic work force may hinder the smooth transfer of skills from a 
multinational to the employees of downstream suppliers triggered by the human capital 
channel. The gap may simply be too wide to bridge. Thus, in lack of sufficient levels of 
absorptive capacity, and in cases where the crowding channel is negative, FDI may have a 
negative impact on growth in the host country. But if the level of absorptive capacity is 
sufficient for FDI to have positive spillovers through the linkages and skills channels, 
these latter channels may outweigh the crowding channel and lead to a positive impact of 
FDI on growth. In consequence, the benefit of attracting FDI to MENA countries cannot 
be determined by theory alone, but ultimately becomes an empirical question. 
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3.2 Empirical Evidence  
There are several empirical studies examining the impact of FDI on host economies. 
These studies can be divided into two overall categories: those looking for an overall, or 
unconditional, linear effect of FDI on growth by including FDI flows in growth, 
technology or productivity regressions; and the studies which assume that the impact of 
FDI on growth is non-linear and depends on absorptive capacity. These studies most often 
interact the FDI term with some selected component of absorptive capacity namely the 
technology gap vis-à-vis some benchmark developed country, the level of skills and 
education of the workforce, the development of the financial sector, and finally, the 
institutional development of the host country. While unconditional studies of the effect of 
FDI on growth have been done for MENA panels, there has to our knowledge not been 
any purely MENA oil producing country study that conditions the effect of FDI on 
absorptive capacity so far. Hence we base our review below on the results of broader 
developing country panel studies. 
Studies which have estimated the unconditional effect of FDI on growth find ambiguous 
and not very stable results. Some studies find zero or even negative correlations between 
FDI and growth, while other studies find a significantly positive relationship. An example 
of the former type of study is van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and Lichtenberg (2001) 
who conduct a panel regression analysis of growth in a broad panel of developing and 
developed countries. More interesting in the Arab world context is the study by Sadik and 
Bolbol (2001), who investigate the effect of FDI through technology spillovers on overall 
total factor productivity for Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia 
over a 20-year period. They find that FDI has not had any manifest positive spillovers on 
technology and productivity over and above those of other types of capital formation. On 
the contrary, there are some indications that the effect of FDI on total factor productivity 
(TFP) has been lower than domestic investments in some of the countries over the period 
studied; this suggests that a negative crowding out effect dominates. 
Other studies find a positive unconditional effect of FDI on growth. Examples include and 
Blomström et al. (1994), Li and Liu (2005), and Haddad and Harrison (1993). The latter 
study uses industry level survey data on Moroccan firms to link the productivity of 
Moroccan firms with the firm specific degree of foreign ownership as well as the degree 
of foreign ownership of the sector to which the firm belongs. They find a higher overall 
level of productivity of firms with higher degree of foreign ownership, and also find that 
firms in sectors with a higher ratio of foreign ownership have higher levels of 
productivity, independently of the firm specific degree of foreign ownership. However, 
these results might just reflect that foreign direct investment flows to sectors and firms 
with higher overall productivity. Haddad and Harrison (1993) note that it is not possible 
to show that the presence of foreign direct investment should have accelerated the growth 
rate, and not just the level, of productivity in domestically owned firms in sectors with 
higher degree of foreign ownership. In a more recent study, Akinlo, (2004) using Nigerian 
annual data, 1970-2001, shows that foreign direct investments in extractive sector do not 
have significant impact on the economic growth. This he attributes to heavy capital 
outlay, little employment opportunities and profits repatriation leading to less capital 
accumulation and consequently low investment and economic growth. 
In all, the results of the literature are ambiguous, and this ambiguity has recently been 
argued to be due to a misspecification of the estimating equation. More specifically, the 
relationship between FDI and growth is likely to be non-linear due to the role played by 
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absorptive capacity in determining the sign and size of the impact. Many developing 
countries may in fact not have reached the necessary levels of absorptive capacity. And 
indeed, as we will see below, some studies have found that FDI affects growth only when 
a certain level of absorptive capacity is reached. 
UNCTAD (1999) examines the impact of FDI on growth in developing countries, and 
finds that FDI is only significantly positive when entered in interaction with the number 
of years of schooling. Lu and Liu (2005) also find the effect interaction between years of 
schooling and FDI on growth to be positive, adding to an overall positive direct effect. 
Borensztein et al. (1998) find more detailed results along the same lines. They study the 
growth effects of FDI inflows in a panel of developing countries and show that FDI does 
indeed contribute to economic growth over and above other forms of capital formation, 
but only when the effect is made conditional on the level of human capital development of 
the host country in question. More specifically, Borensztein et al. (1998) and others find 
that FDI has a positive impact on growth when the average years of secondary schooling 
of the male population above 25 years of age exceeds the threshold of 0.52.  A priori we 
expect the FDI to have a positive effect on growth as the MENA oil producing countries 
under investigation surpass this threshold of educational attainment. Unfortunately it is 
contrary to expectation; it is neither positive nor significant. 
Other studies have found indications that FDI may have a positive effect on growth when 
the host country’s financial market development has reached a certain degree of 
development. An example is Durham (2004), who studies the impact of FDI on growth in 
a broad panel of countries, investigating the interaction between FDI and a list of factors 
suspected of determining the level of absorptive capacity. The two factors which come 
out significant are financial sector development and institutional development. We return 
to the latter below. Regarding the former, Durham measures financial market 
development by total stock market capitalization relative to GDP. Four Arab countries are 
included in the study, namely Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia. According to his 
results, only Jordan scores high enough on stock market capitalization to potentially 
benefit from FDI though sufficiently developed financial markets. Since the four above 
mentioned Arab countries have some of the highest stock market capitalizations of the 
Arab world, this means that according to this measure, no other Arab countries would 
have surpassed the threshold for sufficient financial market development to benefit from 
FDI. The financial sectors of Arab countries are highly bank based, so this conclusion is 
to be expected when using a market based measure of financial market development. The 
conclusion changes when bank based financial sector development measures are used. For 
example, Hermes and Lensink (2003), also conducting a broad country panel study, find 
that a certain degree of host country development of the financial system, measured as 
domestic credit to the private sector provided by the banking sector, is an important 
prerequisite for FDI to have a positive effect on the host economy. Their results imply 
that domestic credit provided by the banking system should exceed 12 percent of GDP for 
the host country to be able to absorb the potential technology diffusion of FDI. Sadik and 
Bolbol (2003) carry out a similar analysis using only Arab countries in their panel data 
set, but investigating the implications of 4 different measures of financial sector 
development. They find that when the banking sector credit to the private sector is above 
13 percent of GDP, FDI will start benefiting the host economy. However Bolbol et al. 
(2005) shows that the bank-based indicators of financial development have negative effect 
on  total factor productivity (TFP) and market-based positive effect, using Egyptian 
annual data, 1974 to 2002. Pagano (1993) using simple endogenous growth model shows 
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that steady growth rate depends positively on the percentage of saving diverted to 
investment. This means that a channel through which financial depth affect growth is 
through converting savings to investment. Armold and Walz (2000) in their theoretical 
exposition distinguish two types of financial systems – bank-dominated and financial 
market dominated systems and show that the effects of financial systems involve 
learning-by-doing in banking. While on the empirical side Alfaro et al. (2004) show that 
lack of financial markets can adversely limit the potential of FDI and benefits of long 
term flows may not be realized in the absence of functioning financial markets. 
There are other factors that affect the FDI spillovers and thus its effect on growth. Among 
these is institutional development. Durham (2004), investigates this and he additionally 
interacts the FDI term with institutional proxies namely an index for the regulation of 
business, an index for the protection of property rights and an index of corruption.  The 
two former are found to significantly influence the impact of FDI on growth. More 
specifically, the business regulation index, which is discrete in nature and ranges from 1 
to 4, is found to have a threshold value of just over 3, which implies that only four out of 
32 countries in the sample pass the threshold. The property rights index is also discrete 
and takes on values from 1 to 5. This index is found to have a threshold value of just over 
3, implying that 11 out of the 32 countries pass the threshold. The implications of these 
findings for whether Arab countries can expect to gain from FDI are not straightforward, 
due to lack of reliable data. However we do not pay much attention to this variable in our 
study but rather we concentrate on the two channels – financial development and human 
capital. We include security risk – the perception of MENA countries by international 
investors.   
 
 
4  Model and Estimation Technique  
The objective of this study is to examine the impact of extractive FDI, financial markets 
and the channel through FDI may be beneficial to growth in MENA oil producing 
countries. For this purpose we follow the model of Alfaro et al. (2004), which is similar 
to Mankiw et al. (1992) model derived based on assumption that countries are unlikely to 
be at their steady states and therefore transitional dynamics are more important. Our 
preferred models are as follows: 
 
tititiit vCTRFDIyGy  3210 )log(               (1) 
 
 tititititiit vCTRFDFDxFDIFDIyGy  543210 )()log(            (2) 
 
Where itGy  is the GDP per capita growth rate of country i , FDI is the ratio of FDI to 
GDP, CTR  is the control variables like trade openness, human capital proxied by average 
years of schooling (SCH), inflation rate, insecurity and exchange rate, FD is financial 
intermediation measures (liquid liabilities over GDP (LLY), Commercial-central banks 
assets ratio (BTOT), private sector credit over GDP (PRIVCR) and Bank credit (BCR), 
market capitalization (MC) is ratio of stock turnover to GDP and FDxFDI  is the 
interaction term  between FDI and financial indicators. 
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The implications of the relations in Esq. 1 and 2 as they relate to 2 , 2  3  and 4  are 
as: If 02  then FDI in extractive sector has a positive effect on growth. While if 
02  and 03  , then the FDI has a positive effect on growth through its interaction 
with financial development which is an enabling condition and the interaction simply 
implies that effect is higher with the enabling conditions.  02   and 04   then the 
FDI in extractive sector and financial development have independent positive effect on 
growth. Therefore there is need for well-developed financial market to create enabling 
conditions for economic growth. 
In estimating the models above, we pool all the data and employ fixed-effect estimation 
technique with the assumption that slope coefficients are the same. That is the variables in 
our models affect the countries in similar fashion. As the data may be not stationary we 
test for stationarity for the data using IPS (Im, Pesaran and Shin) procedures. We estimate 
the coefficients of the models using fixed-effect technique and data from seven MENA oil 
producing countries, namely Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Iran, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and 
United Arab Emirates covering the period, 1980 – 2004. The sources of data are shown in 
Table A1 in Appendix. 
 
 
5  Empirical Results 
5.1 Panel Unit Root Test 
Testing for stationarity has become a conventional in econometrics analysis involving 
panel data as it is in time series. We begin our investigation by examining the time 
properties of our data set using IPS (Im, Persaran and Shin, 1997, 2003). The results of 
the stationarity test of our panel data set are not presented here due to space constraint but 
can be produced on request.  With the exception of initial GDP per capita, population 
growth rate, ratio of commercial banks domestic assets to central bank plus commercial 
bank domestic assets and exchange rate, other variables are stationary in their level, at 5% 
significance level.  However, all the data series are stationary in their first differences.  
 
5.2 Growth and FDI 
In this section we examine the effect of FDI in extractive sector on economic growth in 
MENA oil producing countries. To begin with, we look at the direct effect of FDI on 
economic growth. For this purpose we estimate equation (1) and the results are reported in 
Table 3. Column (1) shows the results for a selection of control variables that include 
initial income per capita, inflation rate, population growth, exchange rate changes, and 
openness. For a sample of seven countries of MENA region, it is clear that FDI in 
extractive sector adversely affects the economic growth than we expect a priori.  
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Table 3: Growth and Foreign direct investment 
 Dependent variable:  per capita growth rate 
Variables 1 2 
Log (Initial GDP) 
0.00044 
(0.0334) 
0.00076 
(0.067) 
FDI 
-0.2607 
(-2.911) 
-0.2662 
(-2.941) 
Inflation rate 
-0.0160 
(-0.571) 
-0.0091 
(-0.324) 
Exchange rate changes 
-0.9619  
(-22.350) 
-0.9612 
(-21.940) 
Schooling  
0.0313 
(1.871) 
0.0270 
(1.8141) 
OPEN 
0.00036 
(47.965) 
0.00036 
(45.817) 
Population growth rate 
-1.0724 
(-1.699) 
-0.9979 
(-1.566) 
Kuwait war  
0.0324 
(0.648) 
Security Risk  
-0.0475 
(-0.987) 
R-squared 0.77 0.77 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.88 1.91 
F-statistics (specific effects) 
0.0713 
 (0.799) 
0.1352 
 (0.714) 
Observations 175 175 
Notes: All the regressions have specific effect coefficients (not reported here) but their 
joint significance test is reported. t-values in parenthesis are white heteroskedastic 
consistent. FDI is the ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP; schooling variable is 
average years of schooling for the population aged 15 years and above; population 
variable is the growth of the population; exchange rate changes is the change in nominal 
exchange rate; OPEN variable is the ratio of exports + imports to GDP; inflation is the 
change in consumer price index; Kuwait war is a dummy variable that takes the value one 
in 1990 and 1991 and otherwise zero; security risk is investment risk as perceived by 
investors. 
 
In column 2 we expand the control variables to include the Kuwait war of 1991 (measured 
by dummy variable that takes the value of one in 1990 and 1991 otherwise zero value) 
and security risk (measured by the Institutional investors’ ratings of investment risk). FDI 
still contributes relatively small to growth. This summarizes the problem that exists in the 
literature: whereas on theoretical grounds there is strong basis for expecting FDI to have a 
positive role in growth process, the empirical evidence is fragile, to say the least, 
especially in countries based on the mineral extraction for greater part of its GDP. This 
ambiguous effect of FDI forms part of motivation for this research. On the other hand, the 
coefficients of openness and average years of schooling carry positive signs and are 
significant. Their effect is in consonant with theory and most empirical evidence in the 
literature. Security risk is of great concern in the Middle East. However, its coefficient has 
a negative sign but not significant. Security is essential for FDI role in enhancing growth 
in MENA oil producing countries. Exchange rate changes affect growth adversely as it 
has negative coefficient and it is highly significant. This adverse effect might be attributed 
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to the Dutch disease syndrome. Although the disease is generally associated with a natural 
resource discovery, it can occur from any development that results in a large inflow of 
foreign currency including a sharp surge in natural resource price, foreign assistance and 
foreign direct investment. The increased supply of foreign currency would drive up the 
value of the domestic currency, which also implies an appreciation in the real exchange 
rate through a rise in the nominal exchange rate. The real exchange rate appreciation 
weakens the competitiveness of the country’s exports and hence causes its traditional 
export sector to shrink.  Since the gratification of wealth is not found in mere possession 
or in lavish expenditure, but in its wise application, a proper and articulated exchange 
policy is vital to improve FDI inflows to other sectors other than the extractive sector. 
Next we examine if the role of FDI on growth could be enhanced through financial 
markets and human capital (SCH). To achieve this, we interact FDI with financial markets 
and use this as a regressor to test for significance of financial markets in enhancing the 
positive externalities associated with FDI flows. To ensure that the interaction term does 
not proxy for FDI or the level of development of financial  markets, both of the variables 
were included in the regression independently as depicted in equation (2). The results of 
this exercise are reported in Table 4.  
As shown in Table 4 the interaction term turns out to be positive in all columns except in 
column (2) where it is negative and significant. Each regression uses a different indicator 
for financial market development and the samples are the same across the columns, 
except in column (6) – MC that has 56 observations. Column (7) uses SCH and PRIVCR. 
The main result is that the interaction term is insignificant at least at 10% level for the 
entire range of financial market indicators used, except for (FDI x LLY) and (FDI x 
BTOT) that are  significant at the 5% level and the  coefficient of (FDI x BTOT) is 
negative. The interaction with PRIVCR, MC, M2 and BCR are not significant. On the 
other hand the financial market indicators by themselves have negative signs except MC 
(stock turnover over GDP) that has a positive sign and is significant at 1% level.  Alfaro 
et al. (2004) attributes this to the interaction term capturing an important allocation 
function that the financial sector performs. In all, the financial markets in MENA oil 
producing countries are underdeveloped. FDI is consistently negative and is significant in 
all the regressions. What does this mean to us? One can rightly say that FDI inflows in the 
MENA oil producing countries are small compare to the need of these countries to 
support the growth process. With underdeveloped financial markets and small inflows of 
FDI the interaction between them will not yield much desired benefits. Thus, as theory 
suggests, in lack of sufficient level of absorptive capacity, and in cases where the 
crowding channel is negative, FDI may have a negative impact on growth in the host 
country. 
 
148                                                                              Kevin O. Onwuka and Taha Chaiechi 
 
Table 4: Growth and FDI – the role of financial markets and human capital; Dependent variable:  per capita growth rate 
Variables (1) LLY (2) BTOT (3) PRIVCR (4) BCR (5) M2 (6) MC (7) SCH & PRIVCR 
 Log (Initial GDP) 
0.00671 
 (0.377) 
-0.0060 
 (-0.378) 
-0.00005 
 (-0.003) 
-0.0011 
(-0.097) 
-0.00026 
(-0.026) 
0.0146 
(0.904) 
-0.0027 
(-0.172) 
FDI 
-0.2718 
 (-3.127) 
-0.2848 
(-4.161) 
-0.2890 
(-2.741) 
-0.2781 
(-3.516) 
-0.2679 
(-3.196) 
0.0331 
(0.152) 
-0.2496 
(-4.339) 
Inflation rate 
-0.0442 
(-1.404) 
-0.06508 
(-1.093) 
-0.0285 
(-0.524) 
-0.0586 
(-1.389) 
-0.0491 
(-1.184) 
-0.0786 
(-2.121) 
-0.04435 
(-1.150) 
Exchange rate changes 
-0.9642 
(-23.600) 
-0.9702 
(-28.082) 
-0.9688 
(-26.452) 
-0.9654 
(-24.462) 
-0.964 
(-23.571) 
-0.9240 
(-57.492) 
-0.96117 
(-22.299) 
Schooling  
0.0298 
(1.444) 
0.0115 
(0.582) 
0.0205 
(0.670) 
0.0260 
(1.781) 
0.0201 
(1.561) 
-0.0688 
(-1.779) 
0.0171 
(0.611) 
OPEN 
0.00035 
(53.654) 
0.00035 
(48.506) 
0.00036 
(47.983) 
0.00035 
(46.246) 
0.00035 
(48.978) 
-0.0855 
(-0.547) 
0.00036 
(47.079) 
Population growth rate 
-1.0969 
(-2.986) 
-0.8183 
(-1.808) 
-1.0162 
(-3.137) 
-1.0476 
(-2.922) 
-0.97359 
(-2.249) 
-0.7550 
(-3.661) 
-0.8741 
(-2.221) 
Security Risk 
-0.0426 
(-0.900) 
-0.0438 
(-0.908) 
-0.04571 
(-0.978) 
-0.0490 
(-0.975) 
-0.0512 
(-1.041) 
-0.00085 
(-0.0165) 
-0.0557 
(-1.280) 
Financial markets 
-0.0350 
(-1.403) 
0.1907 
(0.993) 
-0.0009 
(-0.287) 
-0.0385 
(-0.892) 
-0.0316 
(-0.622) 
0.1061 
(3.482) 
0.00026 
(0.092) 
FDI x Financial markets 
0.0849 
(2.143) 
-4.5594 
(-2.149) 
0.0348 
(0.689) 
0.0750 
(1.442) 
0.0792 
(1.448) 
0.1184 
(1.458)  
FDI x schooling       
-1.7040 
(-1.554) 
R-squared 0.767 0.753 0.768 0.762 0.762 0.455 0.754 
D-W 1.936 1.960 1.979 1.910 1.903 2.882 1.927 
F-statistic (specific effects) 
1.5219 
 (0.2192) 
0.0030 
 (0.9563) 
0.3649 
 (0.5467) 
0.6973 
 (0.3857) 
0.3181 
 (0.5735) 10.6341 (0.0018) 
0.0245 
 (0.8758) 
F-statistic (Financial markets  and interaction ) 
1.0105 
(0.3163) 
4.7371 
 (0.0310) 
0.4720  
(0. 4931) 
0.4824 
 (0.4883) 
0.7277  
(0.3949) 
6.8071 
 (0.0114) 
2.3543 
 (0.1270) 
F-statistic (FDI and interaction) 
4.5200 
 (0.0351) 
5.0109 
 (0.0266) 
9.1888 
 (0.0028) 5.7122 (0.0180)) 
4.4948  
(0.0356) 
0.6136  
(0.4365) 2.96095 (0.0872) 
Observations 175 175 175  175 56 175 
Notes: t-values in parenthesis are heteroskedastic consistent. The financial market variable changes with each column and are all 
logarithms of the actual values. F-statistics test the joint significance of coefficients of specific effects. The F-statistics for financial 
market tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients for financial market and the interaction terms are jointly zero. F-statistics for FDI 
tests that the coefficients for FDI and the interaction term are jointly zero. The values in parenthesis below the test statistics indicate p-
values. 
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As can be seen in Table 4 there is considerable variation in the coefficients of the FDI as 
the financial indicator changes, warranting the need to look at the range of financial 
market variables rather  than a few.  To test whether our selected countries have the same 
intercept we conduct joint significance test on country specific coefficients using Wald 
test statistics. Table 4 also reports the results of this joint significance test on specific 
effects. The hypothesis that the country specific coefficients are the same cannot be 
rejected in all the regression except in column (6). This means that all the countries 
considered in this study share similar policies or common problems. We also conduct a 
joint significance test on financial market with the interaction term and a joint 
significance test on FDI with the interaction term. For most financial variables, the tests 
could not confirm the importance of both financial markets and FDI except in two cases – 
the BTOT and MC. The hypothesis that the coefficients of both FDI and the interaction 
between FDI and financial markets are zero is rejected outright at 10% level but only in 
the case of MC (column 6). As can be observed from the Table 4 the coefficients of the 
interaction terms in these two regressions report the lowest t-statistics compared with the 
others. As indicated by these tests FDI and financial market are very necessary in the 
growth process but unfortunately the amount of FDI inflows to the region is very small 
and financial markets are underdeveloped. 
Also tested is the joint significance of both FDI and SCH (human capital) with the 
interaction term. The hypothesis that the coefficients of SCH and the interaction term are 
zero cannot be rejected at 10%, while the hypothesis that the coefficients of FDI and 
interaction terms are zero is rejected at 10%. This suggests that human capital is vital in 
enhancing the role of FDI in the economic growth especially in developing oil economies, 
as it facilitates learning-by-doing and acquisition of new technology. Development of 
human capital and financial market are necessary for the MENA oil producing countries 
to reap the full benefits associated with FDI.  We are not surprised at the results of the 
investigations as FDI inflows to the MENA region remain relatively small and contribute 
only very modestly to gross fixed capital formation. Krogstrup and Matar (2005) noted 
that the overall build-up of capital formation was mainly financed by domestic public and 
private funds. 
To get estimate of how importance the financial sector is in enhancing the growth effects 
of FDI, one can ask the hypothetical question of how much a one standard deviation 
increase in the financial market variable would enhance the growth rate of a country 
receiving the mean value of FDI in the sample. However as the coefficients of the 
financial market variables are not significant, this is excluded. But for readers who would 
like see the net effect of financial markets on MENA oil producing countries, we refer 
them to Appendix Table 2. 
Empirical studies have found positive correlation between GDP growth rate and domestic 
investment. Some empirical studies have suggested that domestic investments are 
necessary for FDI spillover into host country, especially in the cross-country regressions. 
To check the robustness of our model we control for domestic investment ratio (domestic 
investment over GDP). For this effect we proxy domestic investment with gross domestic 
savings ratio to GDP and include it as independent variable. The results are reported in 
Table 5.   
Including the domestic investment does not lead to much change in the results.  The FDI 
is consistently negative and significant in most cases. Its magnitude does not change as 
well. But however there is a noticeable reduction in t-ratios. This suggests that FDI is 
below the threshold necessary to spur development or growth rate. Even though the F-test 
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indicates that FDI is indispensable in the growth process perhaps through its role in 
capital accumulation, its long run effect is yet to be realised in MENA oil producing 
countries. The results on interaction terms do not differ from the results obtained in Table 
4. The coefficients are positive except in column (2) and not significant but only in the 
cases of LLY (column 1) and BTOT (column 2).  As expected,   domestic investment 
enters significantly in all the regressions. In most literatures the interaction between FDI 
and human capital has been shown to have a positive effect on economic growth 
(Borensztein et al., 1998; Alfaro et al., 2004). This is reported in column (7). The 
interaction between FDI and SCH contradicts the earlier findings in the literature, and 
instead it is negative and not significant. We are not surprised at these results as two 
variables are below their threshold levels. What do we learn from the entire results? They 
confirm that the enabling conditions are necessary for positive externality effects of FDI 
to be realised. Although we need more convincing results to come to firm conclusion on 
these issues in MENA region. However we need not generalise our results. The picture 
might look different in other developing nations with different policies and less mineral 
resources but concentrate on manufacturing FDI to facilitate growth. 
 
 
6  Endogeneity Issues and Policy Implications of the Results 
From the preceding discussion there has been no mention endogeneity problem. On the 
theoretical point of view it is plausible and also very likely that both the magnitude of FDI 
and the efficiency of financial markets increase with higher growth rate. This would lead 
to an overstatement of the effects of each of the two variables and their interaction on 
growth, since we use the average values of these variables to estimate the coefficients in 
Tables 4 and 5.  Thus we need to construct instruments of FDI and Domestic investment 
variables. Following the evidence provided by Wheeler and Mody (1992) that FDI is self-
reinforcing (that is the existing stock of foreign investment is a significant determinant of 
current investment decisions) lagged FDI is used as an instrument for FDI. Also the 
lagged of domestic investment is used as an instrument for domestic investment.  The 
results of this exercise are reported in Table 6. The results continue to support the findings 
in Tables 4 and 5. The coefficients of financial markets did not change much with earlier 
OLS results in Tables 4 and 5. Instrumental variable estimation here corrects for classical 
measurement error, which biases the OLS coefficients to zero.        
What are the implications of the results of this study? Several implications can be arrived 
at from our results. First, FDI being consistently negative shows that its effect on the 
economic performance is small and it has not reached the level required to boost 
economic growth. Some studies have found FDI to have negative effects on growth in a 
host country due to negative crowding effects outweighing potentially positive 
externalities. Our study suggests that domestic investment leads to increased growth. A 
link between foreign firms and local firms will yield more dividends.  
Second, the MENA oil producing countries as a group does not currently seem to be 
benefiting substantially from FDI, given the low level of current FDI and the result of 
this. This does not mean that no country is benefiting from FDI.  
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Table 5: Growth and FDI – robustness – domestic investment; Dependent variable: per capita growth rate 
 (1) LLY (2) BTOT (3) PRIVCR (4) BCR (5) M2 (6) MC (7) SCH  &  PRIVCR 
log(initial GDP) 
0.0237 
 (1.001) 
0.0191 
 (0.726) 
0.0249 
 (0.933) 
0.0249 
 (1.113) 
0.0223 
 (1.227) 
0.0114 
 (0.568) 
0.0111 
(0.432) 
FDI 
-0.2651 
 (-2.695) 
-0.2588 
 (-3.193) 
-0.2488 
 (-2.062) 
-0.2699  
(-2.515) 
-0.2505  
(-2.088) 
-0.0071  
(-0.039) 
-0.2459  
(-2.482) 
Inflation rate 
-0.0567 
(-1.827) 
-0.0754 
(-1.399) 
-0.0358  
(-0.719) 
-0.0656 
 (-1.492) 
-0.0569  
(-1.424) 
-0.0764 
 (-2.209) 
-0.0739 
 (-1.655) 
Exchange rate changes 
-0.9612  
(-20.942) 
-0.9664 
(23.791) 
-0.9655 
 (-22.499) 
-0.9570 
(-18.708) 
-0.9567 
(-18.810) 
-0.9228  
(-52.201) 
-0.9665 
(22.546) 
Schooling 
0.0404 
 (1.425) 
0.0258 
 (0.815) 
0.0345 
 (0.860) 
0.0417  
(1.666) 
0.0347 
 (1.476) 
-0.0705  
(-1.349) 
-0.0842  
(-0.339) 
OPEN 0.00036 (69.878) 
0.00036 
(66.006) 0.00036 (59.581) 0.00035 (72.025) 0.00036 (71.017) 
-0.0711  
(-0.451) 0.00036 (70.942) 
Population growth rate 
-1.0410 
 (-2.697) 
-0.7763  
(-1.088) 
-1.0410  
(-2.120) 
-1.0977  
(-3.321) 
-0.9728  
(-2.237) 
-0.8363 
 (-3.761) 
-0.8508 
(-1.518) 
Security risk 
-0.0357 
 (-0.705) 
-0.0381 
(-0.790) 
-0.0389 
 (-0.771) 
-0.0501  
(-0.972) 
-0.0499 
 (-1.015) 
-0.0081  
(-0.160) 
-0.0523  
(-0.959) 
Financial Markets 
-0.0247 
(-1.305) 
0.2550  
(1.302) 
-0.0017 
 (-0.647) 
-0.0286  
(-0.560) 
-0.0122  
(-0.190)  
0.1018 
 (3.298) 
-0.0026  
(-1.184) 
FDI x Financial markets 
0.0848 
(1.834) 
-4.1448 
(-1.769) 
0.0230  
(0.505) 
0.0787 
 (1.280) 
0.0824 
 (1.293) 
0.1261 
 (1.637)  
Domestic investment 
0.2648 
(2.189) 
0.3113 
 (2.565) 
0.2988 
(2.334) 
0.3055 
 (2.262) 
0.2949  
(2.119) 
-0.0603 
(-0.679) 
0.2862 
(2.728) 
FDI x Schooling       
-1.9812 
 (-1.611)   
R-squared 0.75 0.73 0.75 0.73 0.73 0.44 0.71 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.904 1.902434 1.91925 1.873269 1.871954 2.887642 2.016 
F-statistic (specific effects) 
2.1649 
 (0.1432) 
3.5135 
 (0.0627) 
1.4053 
 (0.2376) 
0.5097 
 (0.4764) 
0.0843 
 (0.7719) 
8.4888 
 (0.0050) 0.2427 (0.6229) 
F-statistic (Financial markets  and interaction ) 
1.3645 
 (0.2446) 
3.2166 
 (0.048) 
0.2365 
 (0.6274) 
1.1798 
 (0.2791) 
1.8601 
 (0.1746) 
7.6234 
 (0.0077) 2.5130 (0.1149) 
F-statistic (FDI and interaction) 
3.2197 
 (0.0747) 
3.4394 
 (0.0655) 
3.9566 
 (0.0484) 
3.5511 
 (0.0614) 
2.6023 
 (0.1087) 
0.5243 
 (0.4719) 3.1350 (0.0786) 
Observations 174 174 174 174 174 77 174 
Notes: Notes: t-values in parenthesis are heteroskedastic consistent. The financial market variable changes with each column and are all 
logarithms of the actual values. F-statistics test the joint significance of coefficients of specific effects. The F-statistics for financial 
market tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients for financial market and the interaction terms are jointly zero. F-statistics for FDI 
tests that the coefficients for FDI and the interaction term are jointly zero. The values in parenthesis below the test statistics indicate p-
values. 
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Third, in fact having FDI is no guarantee for stronger economic growth. However it is 
quite unfortunate that most of the absorptive capacities, namely financial markets, 
examined fall below their threshold thus their impact in enhancing the role of FDI is 
small. Most the financial market indicators are negative and where they are positive they 
are not significant. Also the interaction terms, with the exception of liquidity ratio and 
commercial-central bank asset ratio, though positive, are not significant. Surprisingly 
however, human capital is well above the threshold of 0.52 years of Borensztein et al. 
(1998) for FDI to have a positive impact.  It is noteworthy that the proxy for human 
capital - average years of schooling of the population aged 15 years and above - include 
women. In some Arab countries women are not allowed to work. This may affect the 
result on the human capital in this study.  
Too, as often pointed out in the literature, the average years of schooling is a measure of 
quantity rather than quality of education. Thus, for example, if a high fraction of 
secondary education in Arab countries is religious schooling exclusively, these statistics 
may not give an accurate picture of the level of absorptive capacity of FDI implied by the 
educational levels in the MENA region.  Unfortunately, there are currently no good 
measures of the level of quality or content in education over time which could be used in 
across country analysis. Hence, country specific evaluations relying on sound judgment 
must be conducted when evaluating whether a given MENA country is currently likely to 
be able to benefit from skills transfers from FDI from more advanced countries. 
More so, the psychological aspect of labour force might be interesting and critical to 
growth.  How many MENA oil producing citizens are really in the labour force? By this 
we mean the willingness of the population to work and participate in the growth process. 
Sustainable development or growth must be evolved internally, not externally. Hence a 
policy aimed at encouraging a greater number of populations to participate is highly 
desired.    
Fourth, security risk as perceived by investors does not constitute much threat to FDI 
inflows and hence growth. This variable is entirely negative and not significant. 
What needs to be done? Policies need to be initiated to accelerate the growth of financial 
markets in the MENA in oil producing countries. Increased financial sector liberalisation 
and private participation are the most likely policies that can facilitate the development of 
financial sector.  As observed by Abed (2003) domestic policy failures that include the 
strong interventionist role of the state, weak integration into international trade and 
insufficient attractiveness to foreign direct investment (FDI) are responsible for poor 
economic performance of the MENA countries. Also a failure to develop closer link with 
the global economy through trade in services and goods other than oil has prevented a 
more positive growth impact of the reforms (see Hoekman and Meserlin, 2002).  
Furthermore, it is clear that policy failures and insufficient reforms often constitute 
bottlenecks to growth. Poorly developed institutions tend to distort the incentive structure 
of economic agents. For oil-exporting MENA countries, in particular, institutions required 
for sustainable growth are less advanced than the level of their per capita income would 
suggest (Nunnenkamp, 2005). The abundance of oil appears to be a curse, rather than a 
blessing. It encourages rent-seeking activities, while discouraging productive activities, 
and thus exerts a negative impact on economic growth via its deleterious impact on 
institutional development.  
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Table 6: Growth and FDI -  endogeneity (IV),  Dependent variable: per capita growth rate 
 (1) LLY (2) BTOT (3) PRIVCR (4) BCR (5) M2 (6) MC (7) SCH  &  PRIVCR 
log(initial GDP) 
0.0247 
 (1.011) 
0.0170 
 (0.923) 
0.0181 
 (0.942) 
0.0194 
 (1.223) 
0.0183 
 (1.117) 
0.0116 
 (0.558) 
0.0113 
(0.452) 
FDI 
-0.2551 
 (-2.495) 
-0.2678 
 (-2.973) 
-0.2398 
 (-2.084) 
-0.2786  
(-2.701) 
-0.2514  
(-2.170) 
-0.0071  
(-0.048) 
-0.2459  
(-2.583) 
Inflation rate 
-0.0567 
(-1.827) 
-0.0746 
(-1.417) 
-0.0538  
(-0.816) 
-0.0655 
 (-1.497) 
-0.0578  
(-1.523) 
-0.0857 
 (-2.312) 
-0.0742 
 (-1.754) 
Exchange rate changes 
-0.9612  
(-21.942) 
-0.9234 
(21.671) 
-0.8755 
 (-20.565) 
-0.8570 
(-19.684) 
-0.8657 
(-19.851) 
-0.8239  
(-53.352) 
-0.8776 
(21.554) 
Schooling 
0.0413 
 (1.625) 
0.0357 
 (0.826) 
0.0337 
 (0.962) 
0.0479  
(1.765) 
0.0358 
 (1.4865) 
-0.0716  
(-1.357) 
-0.0851  
(-0.348) 
OPEN 0.00036 (67.745) 
0.00037 
(65.06) 0.00034 (60.251) 
0.00033 
 (72-.012) 0.00035 (71.017) 
-0.0812  
(-1.561) 0.00035 (72.842) 
Population growth rate 
-0.9410 
 (-2.997) 
-0.8563  
(-1.097) 
-1.0510  
(-2.230) 
-1.0984  
(-3.522) 
-0.8768  
(-2.437) 
-0.8560 
 (-3.764) 
-0.7602 
(-1419) 
Security risk 
-0.0457 
 (-0.605) 
-0.0289 
(-0.892) 
-0.0375 
 (-0.871) 
-0.0521  
(-0.984) 
-0.0562 
 (-1,315) 
-0.0182  
(-0.181) 
-0.0463  
(-1.059) 
Financial Markets 
-0.0347 
(-1.505) 
0.3540  
(1.503) 
-0.0117 
 (-0.746) 
-0.0290  
(-0.662) 
-0.0123  
(-0.291)  
0.1017 
 (3.462) 
-0.0125  
(-1.290) 
FDI x Financial markets 
0.0848 
(1.946) 
-3.4645 
(-1.684) 
0.0131  
(0.607) 
0.0677 
 (1.560) 
0.0815 
 (1.383) 
0.0273 
 (1.577)  
Domestic investment 
0.2648 
(2.543) 
0.4123 
 (2.764) 
0.3518 
(2.436) 
0.3045 
 (2.342) 
0.2739  
(2.318) 
-0.0702 
(-0.874) 
0.1964 
(2.852) 
FDI x Schooling       
-0.9913 
 (-1.526)   
R-squared 0.71 0.70 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.42 0.69 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.875 1.902 2.012 1.773 1.862 2.889 2.015 
F-statistic (specific effects) 
1.9649 
 (0.1232) 
4.3126 
 (0.0428) 
2.3155 
 (0.3368) 
0.8018 
 (0.6745) 
0.0864 
 (0.8812) 
9.0458 
 (0.0030) 0.3247 (0.7235) 
F-statistic (Financial markets  and interaction ) 
1.4655 
 (0.2526) 
3.5172 
 (0.027) 
0.3475 
 (0.8064) 
1.2868 
 (0.4785) 
1.7621 
 (0.2527) 
6.6234 
 (0.0086) 2.6231 (0.1045) 
F-statistic (FDI and interaction) 
3.319 
 (0.0847) 
3.7395 
 (0.0545) 
4.5560 
 (0.0432) 
3.8512 
 (0.0474) 
2.8023 
 (0.0871) 
0.4845 
 (0.6714) 3.4362 (0.0665) 
Observations 174 174 174 174 174 77 174 
Notes: Notes: t-values in parenthesis are heteroskedastic consistent. The financial market variable changes with each column and are all 
logarithms of the actual values. F-statistics test the joint significance of coefficients of specific effects. The F-statistics for financial 
market tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients for financial market and the interaction terms are jointly zero. F-statistics for FDI 
tests that the coefficients for FDI and the interaction term are jointly zero. The values in parenthesis below the test statistics indicate p-
values.
154                                                                              Kevin O. Onwuka and Taha Chaiechi 
 
Thriving of rent-seeking activities shows the inefficiency of institutions and or 
corruptions. A producer is able to hide part of his output from both bribery and taxation
3
.  
Thus, there is a great need for a good tax policy that would extract rent from foreign 
companies operating in the MENA oil producing countries. Institutions (both legal and 
economic institutions such as board of Inland Revenue) need to be strengthened. How the 
society would invest the rents (resources) so extracted to increase the social welfare is 
very important and it might depend upon the institutions’ strengthens.    
As oil and gas sector requires substantial capital outlay, which is beyond that capacity of 
domestic investors, or other interested individuals, pre-processing of the oil in the host 
country is necessary as this would generate employment and allow for domestic citizens’ 
participation in the growth process. 
More country-specific research on the impact of FDI in extractive sector in MENA 
countries is clearly called for to clarify which specific countries fall into which of these 
groups. It is in this respect important to keep in mind that cross country comparable data 
on different measures of absorptive capacity are scarce, and what is available is likely to 
be imprecise and potentially misleading. Country specific research may hence prove to 
yield the most interesting result if conducted on sector or industry levels using micro and 
survey data rather macro data 
 
 
7  Conclusions 
While multitude of theories suggests that FDI has positive externalities in the host 
country, FDI in the extractive sector seems to be portraying a different picture. The FDI 
contribution to fixed capital formation is very small in MENA oil producing countries. 
This suggests that the overall build-up of capital formation is mainly financed by 
domestic public and private funds. Hence its role to enhance or drive growth remains 
unclear. It is domestic investment that does posses the driving force to accelerate growth 
in economies examined. 
Absorptive capacities – financial markets and human capital in most cases are below their 
threshold and as such could not enhance the role FDI in extractive sector in growth 
process of the economies examined. Researches indicate that host countries need to have 
attained a certain level of absorptive capacity for the host country to be able to garner 
these positive externalities. Short of this level of absorptive capacity, as we have observed 
in this study, FDI may even exhibit negative externalities. Even where absorptive capacity 
(as is the case of human capital in MENA) is high the willingness to work is low coupled 
with small populations. Engaging outside labor force is an interim remedy to meet short 
supply of local workers but not the long term solution. As we have pointed out a true 
economic growth or development must come from nationals.  This conclusion is very 
sensitive to the absorptive capacity measures used, however.  More country specific 
research is needed to establish robust conclusions.  
Our analysis has made one point very clearly: there is no reason for MENA oil producing 
countries to expect positive externalities that come with an increase in FDI inflows when 
the enabling conditions are low or any reason for implementing costly incentive schemes, 
such as tax holidays, investment subsidies, export credits and other measures favoring 
FDI. Such policies may reduce overall welfare by resulting in wasted political as well as 
                                                 
3
 For more information on rent seeking activities and growth see Angeletos  and Kollintzas (2000)   
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economic resources if the country in question does not have a sufficient level of 
absorptive capacity. Rather, the countries under investigation would benefit by 
implementing policies to improve on their capacity to absorb FDI, such that more benefits 
may be reaped from existing and future FDI stocks. An upgrade of the human capital 
stock through an improvement in the quality and quantity of education, an improvement 
in the functioning of the financial sectors, a strengthening the quality of business 
regulation are all policies that fall into this category. In turn, countries with sufficiently 
high levels of absorptive capacity would only gain more from their existing and future 
FDI stocks and inflows. For countries below the threshold level of absorptive capacity, 
policies to upgrade this capacity are very likely to attract more FDI on their own account. 
Only at this time will FDI flows more likely to be associated with positive externalities 
due to the higher levels of absorptive capacity. Finally, pre-processing of mineral 
resources in host countries may create more opportunities for the citizens’ participation.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1: Variables and Data Sources 
Variables Sources of Data 
Foreign direct investment (FDI): World Development Indicator database 
GDP per capita World Development Indicator database 
Capitalization (MC): World Bank Financial Structure Database. 
Liquidity (LLY): World Bank Financial Structure Database 
Private sector credit (PRIVCR) World Bank Financial Structure Database. 
Bank credit (BCR): World Bank Financial Structure Database. 
Commercial-central bank (BTOT) IFS online database of IMF. 
Inflation:  World Development Indicator database 
Exports World Development Indicator database 
Imports World Development Indicator database 
Trade openness (OPEN) IFS online database of IMF. 
Human capital (Average  years of 
schooling) 
Barro and Lee (2000). Human Capital 
Updated Files 
Kuwait war Dummy variable 
Exchange rate IFS online database of IMF. 
Security risk Institutional Investors Ratings 
Population IFS online database of IMF. 
Gross Domestic Product World Development Indicator database 
 
Net Effect of Financial Market 
To get estimate of how importance the financial sector is in enhancing the growth effects 
of FDI, one can ask the hypothetical question of how much a one standard deviation 
increase in the financial market variable would enhance the growth rate of a country 
receiving the mean value of FDI in the sample. However as the coefficients of the 
financial market variables are not significant, this is excluded. But for readers who would 
like see the net effect of financial markets on MENA oil producing countries, we refer 
them to Appendix Table 
The result of this exercise is reported in Table 5. Panel (A) shows the overall net effect
4
 of 
each of the financial market variable. 
The overall net effect of financial markets on the MENA oil producing countries turns out 
to be positive and but small in magnitude. However the overall net effect of average years 
of schooling is negative. For instance, if we use the LLY variable (column 1) it means 
that having a better financial market would allow countries to experience an annual 
growth rate increase of 0.002% over the 25-year period. Panel B reports the effects on 
individual countries for each of the financial market variable. As can be observed there is 
a considerable variation depending on which financial market variable we look at. Almost 
                                                 
4
The net effect is calculated for example as )log(3)log(2 PRIVCRPRIVCRxFDImeanx   , 
see Alfaro et al. (2004) for more details. The effects are in percentage as we used to logarithms of 
the financial variables in the analysis. 
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all turn out to be negative except in columns 2 and 6 – BTOT and MC. For example, a 
one standard deviation increase in MC will allow Bahrain to experience annual growth 
rate increase of 0.08%, Iran 0.60% , Kuwait 0.04%, Qatar 0.42%, Oman 0.073%, UAE 
0.70% and Saudi Arabia 0.05%. The liquidity (LLY), M2, PRIVCR and BCR are 
disturbing since they suggest that countries experience a negative effect due to FDI. This 
might be attributed to the fact that some banks in MENA oil producing countries are less 
developed compared to stock markets. However, the data for stock market are less than 20 
years and the turnover is very high. However, irrespective of the financial market variable 
we use there remains the problem that the effect is very small. One possible explanation is 
that we might have forced a linear relationship on what is essentially a non-linear 
interaction between FDI and financial markets
5
. Secondly, insufficiently developed 
financial markets or institutions can choke the positive effect of FDI. Thirdly the oil 
producing countries of MENA region have not reached the threshold level of the 
absorptive capacities (human capital and financial markets development) or in the FDI 
level. Policies to raise the levels of these critical factors should, as a matter, be give 
priority attention. The policies might be directed towards further liberalization of financial 
sector and investments. 
 
Table A.2: Net effect of FDI 
Panel A Net effect of FDI 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 LLY BTOT PRIVCR BCR M2 MC SCH 
Net effect of FDI 0.002 0.031 0.003 0.0021 0.0013 0.012 -0.0011 
        
Observations 175 175 175 175 175 77 175 
Cross section units  7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Panel B Net effect  of FDI for Individual countries 
Bahrain -0.015 -0.027 0.0002 -0.005 -0.005 0.082 -0.0200 
Iran -0.044 0.244 -0.0003 -0.006 -0.007 0.600 -0.0003 
Kuwait -0.010 0.081 -0.0005 -0.020 -0.009 0.040 0.0020 
Qatar -0.049 0.317 -0.0009 -0.031 -0.043 0.416 0.000005 
Oman -0.035 0.085 -0.0002 -0.025 -0.020 0.073 -0.0038 
UAE -0.027 0.445 -0.0024 -0.102 -0.085 0.691 0.000007 
Saudi Arabia -0.023 0.018 -0.0050 -0.014 -0.010 0.048 -0.0007 
 
 An alternative way to see how countries perform is to simply use the estimated 
coefficients for the sample of countries and calculate the net effect of FDI on growth for 
each country. We use only the mean to calculate the net effect of FDI, minimum and 
maximum values may give a different picture of the net effect.  The result of this exercise 
is shown in Table A3 in Appendix.  Again there is considerable variation in the net effect 
of FDI on growth rate under alternative financial market variables.  With the exception of 
Kuwait, other countries have negative net effect of FDI, with the financial markets and 
average years of schooling. The Qatar and UAE recorded the lowest net effect.  
 
                                                 
5
 For more explanation see Alfaro et al., (2004) and Borensztein et al., (1998). 
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Table A.3: Net effect for Individual Countries 
 Net effect for Individual countries 
 LLY BTOT PRIVCR BCR M2 MC SCH 
        
Bahrain -0.02422 -0.47093 -0.01697 -0.02062 -0.0181 -0.09511 -0.17493 
Iran -0.00048 0.012108 -0.00024 -0.00031 -0.00026 -0.00022 -0.00203 
Kuwait 0.00374 0.066879 0.003037 0.003387 0.002902 0.016815 0.032629 
Qatar -2.1E-13 -1.7E-12 -8.2E-14 -1.5E-13 -7.2E-15 -9.9E-14 5.23E-15 
Oman -0.0527 0.095733 -0.02395 -0.04498 -0.04684 -0.03145 0.007691 
UAE -3.4E-14 -3.2E-13 -1.5E-14 -2.8E-14 -5.1E-15 -1.5E-14 1.58E-15 
Saudi Arabia -0.01276 -0.01128 -0.00474 -0.01095 -0.01091 -0.01282 0.002534 
Notes: the net effect here is equal to )log(( 32 FinancexFDIxFDIx itit    
 
 
 
 
 
 
